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Abstract 
The present study investigated how emotion regulation strategies moderate the influence of 
disgust sensitivity on crime scene evaluations. Participants were exposed to gruesome 
photographs of crime scenes while they reappraised, suppressed or freely experienced their 
emotions. Participants provided punitive judgments and completed a memory questionnaire. 
In addition, individual differences in level of disgust sensitivity and emotional responses to 
the photographs were measured. Results demonstrate that participants who used suppression 
remember crime scene details worse than participants who freely watched photographs. 
Participants who reappraised emotions remember crime scene details equally well compared 
to participants who suppressed emotions and freely watched photographs. No differences 
between emotion regulation strategies are found on punitive judgments. However, important 
indications are found in the direction that individuals differ in their punitive judgments based 
on disgust sensitivity. No interaction effects are found between instruction conditions and 
disgust sensitivity on crime scene evaluations. Therefore this study suggests that emotion 
regulation strategies do not moderate the influence of disgust sensitivity on crime scene 
evaluations.   
KEYWORDS: Emotion Regulation Strategies, Disgust Sensitivity, Gruesome Photographs, 
Crime Scene Evaluations.  
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How Emotion Regulation Strategies Moderate the Influence of Disgust Sensitivity on Crime 
Scene Evaluations. 
 Nowadays, the accessibility and quality of audiovisual material is better than ever 
before. Technological growth in documenting and sharing information affects not only the 
Dutch society, but it has an impact on the Dutch criminal justice system as well. In the future 
the Dutch criminal justice system will work more often with digitization (Ministerie van 
Justitie en Veiligheid, 2016), such as sharing, evaluating and demonstrating audiovisual 
evidence (Dubelaar & Vanderveen, 2009). Digitization of audiovisual evidence provides new 
possibilities. For example, reconstructing a crime scene will be less complex with digitization 
of audiovisual evidence (Fowle & Schofield, 2011). In addition, digitization makes it possible 
to view and discuss documents (containing images of victims), files or visual reconstructions 
of a crime scene at different times by different people (Schofield & Fowle, 2013). Although 
digitization of audiovisual material provides new possibilities in the Dutch criminal justice 
system, it may have negative consequences for individuals and crime scene evaluations. For 
instance, exposure to visual evidence that includes extreme suffering or gruesomeness details, 
can have negative effects on individuals’ health (Sollie, Kop, & Euwema, 2014). In addition, 
gruesome visual evidence is more convincing and will be better reminded compared to non-
visual evidence (Dubelaar & Vanderveen, 2009). Other effects of visual evidence can be on 
moral judgments. Previous studies showed that exposure to gruesome visual evidence can 
arouse negative emotions, like disgust and anger (Bright & Goodman-Delahunty, 2006). This 
may bias moral decision making (Bright & Goodman-Delahunty, 2006; Wheatley & Haidt, 
2005). Through visual evidence possibly generated emotions may affect attribution of blame, 
responsibility and information processing (Feigenson, 2016), because an emotional 
experience can restrict cognitive resources that need to be available for well-grounded 
decisions (Greene & Haidt, 2002). For instance, exposure to gruesome visual evidence causes 
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the experience of negative emotions (Bright & Goodman-Delahunty, 2006) that increases 
severity of moral judgments (Schnall, Haidt, Clore, & Jordan, 2008; Wheatley & Haidt, 
2005). In addition, the experience of negative emotions may result in higher conviction rates 
(Bright & Goodman-Delahunty, 2006) and more sympathy for the victim (Cush & Goodman-
Delahunty, 2006). 
  In the present study the focus will be on the influence of disgust responses on moral 
judgments. Disgust is a negative emotion that was most likely useful to avoid toxic food and 
diseases (Rozin & Fallon, 1987). Nowadays, it can be seen as an emotion that manages our 
moral behavior (Pizarro, Inbar, & Helion, 2011). Among different cultures, immoral acts lead 
to the experience of disgust (Rozin, Lowery, Imada, & Haidt, 1999). The experience of 
disgust is used to reject socially inappropriate individuals and behavior (Haidt, Rozin, 
McCauley, & Imada, 1997). However, intensity of the experience of disgust depends on 
someone’s individual level of disgust sensitivity. Disgust sensitivity is a personality trait in 
which individuals differ in their experience of disgust (Haidt, McCauley, & Rozin, 1994). 
Because disgust affects the objectivity of individuals in their moral judgments, it is important 
to investigate the influence of disgust sensitivity on moral judgments. Moreover, how to 
control the influence of disgust sensitivity on legal decision making, to proceed the process of 
legal decision making against the offender more fairly. Individuals are not conscious that 
emotions affect cognition, because most effects of emotions are not consciously available 
(Edwards & Bryan, 1997). In addition, because an individuals’ emotional reaction can be seen 
as a reliable information source, individuals do not have the motivation to revise for it 
(Zajonc, 1980). In the criminal justice system it is relevant to make individuals more aware of 
the source of the bias (Cush & Goodman-Delahunty, 2006). Moreover, it will be relevant to 
give them instructions to remove the source of the bias in their decision making process by 
counteract the improper influence of negative emotions (Cush & Goodman-Delahunty, 2006). 
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However, it is still not clear what instructions may or may not be useful and the reasons 
behind (Sklansky, 2013). Blechert, Sheppes, Di Tella, Williams and Gross (2012) investigated 
that emotions can be effectively regulated by instructing individuals to control their emotions 
with emotion regulation strategies. Emotion regulation strategies can be used by individuals to 
down-regulate the experience of negative emotions (Gross, 2002). We have relatively little 
knowledge about the moderating effect of emotion regulation strategies on the influence of 
disgust sensitivity on moral judgments. When we know how emotion regulation strategies 
moderate the influence of disgust sensitivity on moral judgments, effective strategies can be 
used in the Dutch criminal justice system to proceed legal decision making against the 
offender more fairly.  
  Therefore, in this study will be examined how emotion regulation strategies moderate 
the influence of disgust sensitivity on crime scene evaluations. The focus will be on the 
influence of emotion regulation strategies and disgust sensitivity on punitive judgments and 
working memory. All theoretical concepts will be explained in the next paragraphs of this 
introduction. First, we explain what is meant in this study with emotion regulation strategies 
and how these strategies affect emotional experience and working memory. Secondly, we 
discuss how disgust sensitivity influences punitive judgments and working memory. Finally, 
we describe the current study and the specific hypotheses.  
The influence of emotion regulation strategies on emotional experience and working 
memory 
  Emotion regulation strategies can be explained by the process model of emotion 
regulation developed by Gross (1998a). According to this model there are two important ways 
individuals can down-regulate their experience of negative emotions. The first emotion 
regulation strategy is antecedent-focused emotion regulation (1998b). This strategy reduces 
the emotional impact by reconstructing with neutral emotions the way a current situation is 
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built (Gross, 2002; Johns, Inzlicht, & Schmader, 2008). In the emotion-generative process, 
antecedent-focused emotion regulation appears before the actual emotion is generated (Gross, 
1998a). A specific strategy of antecedent-focused emotion regulation is reappraisal (Webb, 
Miles, & Sheeran, 2012). Reappraisal can be distinguished in three different subtypes: 
reappraisal of emotional responses, reappraisal of emotional stimulus and reappraisal by 
perspective taking (Webb et al., 2012). In this study the focus will be on reappraisal by 
perspective taking. Reappraisal by perspective taking contains that individuals reduce the 
impact of the emotion by looking at it from a perspective which is more objective (e.g., 
‘‘participants may be asked to imagine themselves in the situation depicted or may be asked 
to be objective or to view the stimulus as detached observers’’; Webb et al., 2012, p. 778). 
The second way people can cope with negative emotions according to the process model of 
emotion regulation, is response-focused emotion regulation (Gross, 1998a). This strategy is 
implemented later in the emotion-generative process compared to antecedent-focused emotion 
regulation (Gross, 1998a). A specific strategy of response-focused emotion regulation is 
suppression, which can be distinguished in three different subtypes: suppression of emotional 
expression, suppression of emotional experience and suppression of thoughts of emotion-
evoking events (Webb et al., 2012). In this study the focus will be on suppression of the 
emotional experience. Suppression of the emotional experience is a strategy where individuals 
have to suppress their emotions (e.g., ‘‘Participants are told to control or not allow 
themselves to experience the focal emotion’’; Webb et al., 2012, p. 778). 
  We will examine in this experiment which emotion regulation strategies can reduce 
the experience of negative emotions. In previous research it has been proposed that certain 
emotion regulation strategies are more effective in reducing emotional biases than other 
strategies (Gross & John, 2003). Several studies found that suppression did not decrease but 
increased the experience of negative emotions (Abramowitz, Tolin, & Street, 2001; Gross & 
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John, 2003). Suppressing emotions can be counterproductive, because attempts to suppress a 
negative emotion can backfire, which causes more focus on the emotion that may result in an 
increase of emotional experience (Abramowitz et al., 2001; Wenzlaff & Wegner, 2000). For 
example, Gross and John (2003) found in their experiment that participants who suppressed 
their emotions during an emotion inducing event, experienced more negative emotions 
compared to non-suppressors. However, in contrast to suppression, several studies indicate 
that reappraisal decreases the experience of negative emotions (Gross, 1998a, 2002; Gross & 
John, 2003). A study of Gross (1998a) demonstrated that reappraisal of emotions during 
exposure to a disgusting movie led to a decreased experience of disgust compared to just 
watching the movie. In addition, reappraisal of emotion decreases initial moral intuitions 
evoked by emotional experience, what leads to more deliberation of moral judgments 
(Feinberg, Willer, Antonenko, & John, 2012). For instance, individuals who reappraised their 
emotions during a movie which induced emotions, experienced less acute emotional 
responses to moral dilemmas, which evoked fewer initial moral intuitions compared to 
individuals who did not receive instructions during the emotion-inducing movie (Feinberg et 
al., 2012). Individuals who reappraised their emotions are less influenced by intuition and 
more driven by deliberate reasoning of the crime compared to individuals who freely 
experienced their emotions (Feinberg et al., 2012). Given these results, we may expect that 
individuals who reappraise their emotions will deliberate their moral judgments. This may 
result in less severe emotionally driven punitive judgments compared to participants who 
freely experience their emotions. In addition, we may expect that since suppression increases 
the experience of negative emotions, individuals who suppress their emotions will make more 
emotionally driven intuitive decisions. This may result in more severe punitive judgments 
compared to individuals who freely experience their emotions.   
  Some emotion regulation strategies are more effective than others in decreasing 
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negative emotions, but also in information processing. We would like to examine in this 
experiment which emotion regulation strategies can eliminate emotional biases without 
affecting working memory. Working memory is a cognitive system that has a restricted 
capacity for remembering and processing information and is important in the process of 
decision making (Cowan, 2008). When working memory is affected due to a certain strategy, 
legal decision makers are less able to make accurate decisions, which may influence crime 
evaluations. Several previous literature indicates that suppression influences working memory 
(Gross, 2002; Richards & Gross, 1999, 2000). For example, individuals who used suppression 
during a film that elicited negative emotions, remembered fewer details of the film compared 
to individuals who reappraised their emotions (Richards & Gross, 2000). This effect can be 
explained by the evidence that individuals need cognitive resources for self-monitoring during 
suppression of emotions (Gross, 2002). Self-monitoring decreases the resources available for 
remembering events (D’Argembeau & Van der Linden, 2006; Gross, 2002). In contrast to 
suppression, several studies argue that reappraisal leaves the memory of emotional events 
intact (Gross, 2002, Richards & Gross, 2000). Gross (2002) suggests that there is no need for 
continuous effort in self-regulation at the time of an emotional situation because reappraisal 
occurs earlier in the emotion-generative process compared to suppression. Therefore, fewer 
resources are needed for self-regulation and more are available for information processing 
which keeps the memory intact (Gross, 2002). For instance, research showed that people who 
usually reappraised emotions had no impaired memory of emotional and contextual details of 
events in the past, whereas people who usually suppressed emotions remembered fewer 
details of events in the past (D’Argembeau & Van der Linden, 2006). 
The influence of disgust sensitivity on punitive judgments and working memory  
  Previous research argues that disgust responses influence moral judgments (Schnall et 
al., 2008). However, the influence of disgust on moral judgments depends on the individual 
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level of disgust sensitivity (Haidt et al., 1994). Therefore, in the present study the influence of 
disgust sensitivity on punitive judgments and working memory will be examined. We will 
name this crime scene evaluations in this experiment. Punitive judgments are part of moral 
judgments and can be measured in prison sentence in years to the defendant. This is an 
important indicator of how severe participants think the offence is. Moreover, it is the 
outcome of legal decision making with obvious implications for the involved offender and 
victim. Previous research demonstrated that highly disgust-sensitive individuals were more 
likely to judge immoral deeds as obscene (Horberg, Oveis, Keltner, & Cohen, 2009; Inbar, 
Pizarro, Knobe, & Bloom, 2009) and assigned more years of imprisonment to the offender 
after exposure to gruesome visual evidence compared to participants who were less disgust-
sensitive (Van Dillen & Vanderveen, 2017). These findings indicate that highly disgust-
sensitive participants can affect the objectivity in decision making during a crime scene 
process.  
  Disgust sensitivity does not only influence our punitive judgments, it also activates an 
avoidance response by increasing distance towards the disgust evoking stimuli (Borg & de 
Jong, 2012). For example, Newhagen (1998) investigated in his experiment how strong the 
avoidance responses were of individuals who were exposed to images which evoked negative 
emotions like anger, disgust and fear. Results showed that disgust inducing images had the 
highest avoidance rating followed by fear and then anger (Newhagen, 1998). In addition, the 
experience of disgust will be more intense for easily disgusted individuals (Haidt et al., 1994). 
Given these results we may expect that for highly disgust-sensitive legal decision makers the 
avoidance response to the disgusting stimuli will be stronger compared to less disgust-
sensitive legal decision makers. This may result in an incomplete memory of the crime scene 
details for highly disgust-sensitive legal decision makers.  
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 In the present study we measure first the level of disgust sensitivity of participants. 
Secondly, we give participants instructions to suppress, reappraise or freely experience their 
emotions before we present them the gruesome crime scene photographs. Finally, we measure 
punitive judgments, memory of crime scene details and emotional responses to the gruesome 
photographs. Taking all the above theory into account we formulate the following hypothesis: 
 
H1: Participants in the suppression condition will be most severe in their punitive 
  judgments, followed by participants in the control condition and then participants in  
  the reappraisal condition.  
 
H2:  Participants in the suppression condition will have a worse memory of crime scene 
details, compared to both participants in the reappraisal condition and participants in 
the control condition. 
 
H3:  Participants with a high level of disgust sensitivity will be more severe in their  
  punitive judgments compared to participants with a low level of disgust sensitivity,  
  this effect will be the strongest for participants in the suppression condition, followed 
  by participants in the control condition and then participants in the reappraisal 
  condition. 
 
H4:  Participants with a high level of disgust sensitivity will have a worse memory of crime  
  scene details compared to participants with a low level of disgust sensitivity, this 
    effect will be the strongest for participants in the suppression condition, followed by 
  participants in the control condition and then participants in the reappraisal condition. 
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Method 
Participants 
  In total 125 individuals participated in the experiment, including 69 women and 56 
men (Mage = 22.69 years, SDage = 6.41 years, from 18 to 62 years). We recruited participants 
via internet; the website of Leiden University and via different psychology discussion groups 
on Facebook. Furthermore, we recruited participants face to face at Leiden University. 
Participants received credits or three euros as compensation for participating in the 
experiment. Participants all agreed with an informed consent, after reading the global design 
of the experiment. This design included information that some photographs could be 
experienced as shocking by people. The Ethics Committee of Leiden University approved the 
experiment. 
Design 
  It was a lab experiment with a 2 (disgust sensitivity; high vs. low) x 3 (instruction; 
suppress vs. reappraise vs. control) between-subjects design. In this study three conditions 
(reappraisal, suppression and control) were compared. In addition, disgust sensitivity was 
measured for all participants as a continuous independent variable. Randomly participants 
were assigned to the reappraisal condition (42 participants), suppression condition (43 
participants) and control condition (40 participants). In this study the dependent variables 
were punitive judgments and memory of crime scene details. In addition, emotional responses 
were measured.  
Stimuli Materials and Questionnaires  
  Disgust sensitivity. Differences between participants in the experience of disgust 
sensitivity were measured by using the Disgust Scale - Revised (Haidt et al., 1994; Olatunji et 
al., 2007). This questionnaire contained different domains of disgust elicitors and consisted 
out of two parts with a 24-item scale (Olatunji et al., 2007). In this experiment we used 
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questions from the second part of the Disgust Scale - Revised. Participants were asked by 
rating a 4-point Likert-type scale (1 = not disgusting at all, 4 = extremely disgusting) how 
disgusting they found particular experiences. For example: ‘‘You see maggots on a piece of 
meat in an outdoor garbage pail’’ (Haidt et al., 1994). Reliability of the 12-item Disgust 
Scale - Revised was high (α = .80).  
  Instructions. Before exposure to the gruesome crime scene photographs, participants 
were instructed about how to regulate their emotions. All participants from different 
conditions were asked to watch the gruesome photographs carefully. Participants in the 
reappraisal condition were asked to imagine that they worked for the technical investigation 
team and that they had to look at the gruesome photographs for their job. Participants in the 
suppression condition were instructed to suppress their emotions when watching the gruesome 
photographs (Hofmann, Rauch, & Gawronksi, 2007). Lastly, participants in the control 
condition received no instructions about how to regulate their emotions and were simply 
instructed to watch the photographs carefully.  
  Photographs of crime scenes. The gruesome photographs were chosen from the data 
collection of gruesome visual evidence (Vanderveen, 2013), that was developed in 
cooperation with the Dutch Police Academy. The gruesome photographs were of high quality 
and realistic reconstructions of a crime scene, comparable with real crime scene photographs. 
The visual evidence selected for the first case was one midrange and one close-up photograph 
of a middle aged male victim (see Appendix A). The male victim was lying in bed with his 
eyes closed, had a head wound and a lot of blood on his face. For the second case one 
midrange and one close-up photograph of a young female victim were selected (see Appendix 
A). The female victim was also lying in bed, with her eyes open and had a head wound too. 
Participants were exposed to the photographs before they filled out questionnaires about 
punitive judgments, memory of crime scene details and emotional responses.  
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  Punitive judgments. Before exposure to the gruesome photographs, participants read 
two case descriptions which described two different murder cases (based on Van Dillen & 
Vanderveen, 2017; see Appendix B). After exposure to the visual evidence for both cases 
participants read the statement: “The offender has been caught and sentenced, the court 
considered the charges proven and has declared both the offender and the fact a criminal 
offense” (Kampen, de Keijser, & Schoep, 2013). Participants were asked to imagine that they 
were the judge and had to assign an unconditional prison sentence by answering for both 
cases the following question: ‘‘How long do you think the offender should go to jail in months 
and/or years?’’ (Kampen et al., 2013). Participants answered the question in months and/or 
years. 
 Memory of crime scene details. To measure if emotion regulation strategies 
influenced participants’ information processing a memory questionnaire was used. There was 
no existing memory questionnaire for the gruesome photographs from the database of 
gruesome visual evidence, therefore we developed our own questionnaire (see Appendix C). 
Participants answered two open-ended questions (e.g., ‘‘Name as many items as you can 
remember on the table next to the male victims bed’’) and 16 multiple choice questions (e.g., 
‘‘How many bracelets was the female victim wearing on her right arm?’’) to measure what 
objects they remembered of the crime scenes. Participants answered the open-ended questions 
by writing down every object they remembered. For each correct answer that participants 
gave they received one point. The two participants who had the most correct answers received 
a Bol.com voucher of 50 euro’s after the experiment. Reliability of the 18-item memory 
questionnaire for the suppression condition (α = .94), reappraisal condition (α = .95) and 
control condition (α = .96) was high. 
  Manipulation check. Emotional responses of participants to the visual evidence 
served as a manipulation check. Participants watched the four photographs from the database 
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of gruesome evidence again at the end of the experiment. They were asked to rate on a 7-point 
scale in which extent the photographs were gruesome, shocking and serious to them (1 = not 
at all, 7 = extremely). The higher the scores were, the more intense participants experienced 
the emotions. In addition, participants were asked to answer multiple choice questions about 
the emotion regulation instructions, to check whether they understood and followed the 
instructions. Finally, participants filled out a small open-ended questionnaire to obtain 
demographic information, such as educational background, gender and age.  
Equipment  
  For the experiment 8 computers from the Leiden University with Qualtrics survey 
software and a resolution of 1920 x 1080 pixels were used.   
Procedure 
  For this experiment small cabins in the lab of Leiden University were used. First, 
participants were directed to a small cabin with a computer and started with the disgust 
sensitivity questionnaire. After participants received instructions about how to regulate their 
emotions and to watch the gruesome photographs carefully they read the first case, followed 
by exposure to photographs from the database of gruesome visual evidence. Next, participants 
read in a statement that the defendant was guilty and assigned years and/or months of 
imprisonment to the defendant. They repeated this procedure for the second case and then 
continued with the memory questionnaire. Next, participants watched the photographs of the 
crime scenes again, followed by a questionnaire to measure their emotional responses, that 
served as a manipulation check. At the end of the experiment participants answered questions 
about the instructions they received and demographic questions about their age, gender and 
educational background. This was then followed by receiving a debriefing and their reward.  
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Results 
Preliminary analyses 
  For data analyzing we used SPSS (version 24), for the statistical tests an alpha level of 
.05 was used. We found, by using a One-Way ANOVA for the suppression condition (M = 
29.84, SD = 6.12), reappraisal condition (M = 29.33, SD = 6.00) and control condition (M = 
30.35, SD = 6.15) that mean individual levels of disgust sensitivity (M = 29.83, SD = 6.06) 
were not different between conditions, F(2, 124) = .29, p =.752, ηp2 = .01. 
  Disgust sensitivity was normally distributed (see Figure 1). Therefore, participants 
(disgust sensitivity) were divided on the basis of a median-split procedure into those who had 
a high level of disgust sensitivity (high scores = 30 – 45) and those who had a low level of 
disgust sensitivity (low scores = 15 – 29).  
Manipulation check 
  For the manipulation check, a between-subjects multivariate analysis of variance 
(MANOVA) was used with participants’ level of disgust sensitivity (high vs. low) and 
instruction (reappraisal vs. suppression vs. control) as independent variables and emotional 
responses (gruesome, shocking and serious) to crime scene photographs as dependent 
variables. This analysis found a significant multivariate effect of disgust sensitivity on 
emotional responses, F(3, 117) = 3.68, p = .014, ηp2 = .09. A significant univariate effect of 
disgust sensitivity (high vs. low) was found on emotional responses for gruesomeness, F(1, 
119) = 5.60, p = .020, ηp2 = .05. Participants with a high level of disgust sensitivity (M = 4.64, 
SD = 1.52) experienced the photographs as more gruesome compared to participants with a 
low level of disgust sensitivity (M = 3.97, SD = 1.53). We also found a significant univariate 
effect of disgust sensitivity (high vs. low) on emotional responses for shockingness, F(1, 119) 
= 6.84, p = .010, ηp2 = .05. Participants with a high level of disgust sensitivity (M = 4.17, SD = 
1.60) experienced the photographs as more shocking than participants with a low level of 
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disgust sensitivity (M = 3.96, SD = 1.52). No significant difference between level of disgust 
sensitivity in emotional responses was found for seriousness, F(1, 119) = .31, p = .581, ηp2 = 
.00. This suggests that there was no difference in emotional responses on seriousness for 
participants with a high level (M = 5.13, SD = 1.56) or low level of disgust sensitivity (M = 
4.96, SD = 1.50). Unexpectedly, the analysis revealed no significant multivariate effect of 
instruction, F(6, 236) = .32, p = .924, ηp2 = .01 and no significant univariate effects of 
instruction, Fs(2, 119) ≤ .32, p ≥ .726, ηp2 = .01 on emotional responses. Participants who 
suppressed or reappraised their emotions and participants who were not instructed with 
emotion regulation strategies, reported the same level of emotions when viewing the crime 
scene photographs again at the end of the experiment (see Table 1 for means and standard 
deviations). Furthermore, no significant multivariate interaction effect, F(6, 236) = .21, p = 
.974, ηp2 = .01 and no significant univariate interaction effects, Fs(2, 119) ≤ .15, p ≥ .859, ηp2 
= .00 were found between disgust sensitivity and instruction on emotional responses (see 
Table 2 for means and standard deviations).  
Punitive judgments 
  Participants’ punitive judgments were measured in years and/or months of prison 
sentence assigned to the offender per case, which varied from 0 years to 60 years (M = 22.70, 
SD = 15.96). According to the central limit theorem we assumed that, since the sample size 
was large enough (N > 30), the sampling distribution was normally distributed (Field, 2013). 
To investigate whether instruction and disgust sensitivity affected punitive judgments, a 
between subjects-analysis of variance (Factorial ANOVA), with instruction (suppression vs. 
reappraisal vs. control) and disgust sensitivity (high vs. low) as independent variables and 
punitive judgments as dependent variable, was conducted. Contrary to our hypothesis, this 
analysis showed no significant main effect of instruction on punitive judgments, F(2, 118) = 
1.16, p = .318, ηp2 = .02. Participants in the suppression condition (M = 25.44, SD = 15.66) 
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assigned the same years of prison sentence to the offender compared to participants in the 
reappraisal condition (M = 20.81, SD = 15.65) and in the control condition (M = 21.80, SD = 
16.59). To be sure that conditions did not significantly differ from each other, a planned 
comparisons analysis for the main effect of instruction was performed. We found no 
significant effect in years of prison sentence to the offender between participants in the 
suppression condition and control condition, t(121) = -1.03, p = .304. Furthermore, there was 
no significant effect in years of prison sentence to the offender between participants in the 
suppression condition and reappraisal condition, t(121) = -1.33, p = .186, and between 
participants in the reappraisal condition and control condition, t(121) = -.28, p = .779. In line 
with our hypothesis, this analysis showed a marginally significant main effect of disgust 
sensitivity on punitive judgments, F(1, 118) = 3.64, p =.059, ηp2 = .03. This result indicates 
the predicted direction that participants with a high level of disgust sensitivity (M = 25.39, SD 
= 17.74) assigned more years of prison sentence to the offender compared to participants with 
a low level of disgust sensitivity (M = 20.10, SD = 13.66). Contrary to our hypothesis, no 
significant interaction effect between instruction and disgust sensitivity on punitive judgments 
was revealed, F(2, 118) = .29, p = .749, ηp2 = .01 (see Table 3 for means and standard 
deviations). One outlier, participant 44, was removed from the dataset but this did not change 
the results.  
Memory of crime scene details 
  Participants’ memory of crime scene details was measured in score on the memory 
questionnaire, which varied from 6 points to 27 points (M = 14.76, SD = 4.07). According to 
the central limit theorem we assumed that, since the sample size was large enough (N > 30), 
the sampling distribution was normally distributed (Field, 2013). To investigate the effects of 
instruction and disgust sensitivity on memory of crime scene details we conducted a between 
subjects-analysis of variance (Factorial ANOVA), with instruction (suppression vs. 
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reappraisal vs. control) and disgust sensitivity (high vs. low) as independent variables and 
memory of crime scene details as dependent variable. This analysis found a significant main 
effect of instruction on participants’ memory of crime scene details, F(2, 119) = 4.87, p = 
.009, ηp2 = .08. To investigate which conditions significantly differed from each other, a 
planned comparisons analysis for the main effect of instruction was performed. We found a 
significant effect in memory scores between participants in the suppression condition and 
control condition, t(122) = 3.12, p = .002. In line with our hypothesis, participants in the 
suppression condition (M = 13.40, SD = 3.95) scored worse on the memory questionnaire 
compared to participants in the control condition (M = 16.10, SD = 3.65). In addition, in line 
with our hypothesis, no significant differences in memory scores were found between 
participants in the reappraisal condition (M = 14.88, SD = 4.21) and control condition, t(122) 
= -1.40, p = .165. In contrast to our hypothesis, there was no significant difference in memory 
scores between participants in the suppression condition and reappraisal condition, t(122) = 
1.73, p = .085. Unexpectedly, no significant main effect of disgust sensitivity on memory of 
crime scene details was found, F(1, 119) = .00, p = .985, ηp2 = .00. Participants with a high 
level of disgust sensitivity (M = 14.82, SD = 4.25) had the same scores on the memory 
questionnaire as participants with a low level of disgust sensitivity (M = 14.70, SD = 3.92). In 
addition, contrary to our hypothesis, the interaction effect between instruction and disgust 
sensitivity on memory of crime scene details was not significant, F(2, 119) = .46, p = .631, ηp2 
= .01 (see Table 4 for means and standard deviations). 
 
Discussion 
  In this study we investigated how emotion regulation strategies moderate the influence 
of disgust sensitivity on crime scene evaluations. Unexpectedly, the manipulation check 
showed that emotion regulation strategies did not influence the extent of emotional responses 
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to the crime scene photographs when these were presented for the second time. As expected, 
highly disgust-sensitive participants experienced the crime scene photographs as more 
gruesome and shocking compared to low disgust-sensitive participants. However, highly 
disgust-sensitive participants experienced the same extent of seriousness to the crime scene 
photographs as low disgust-sensitive participants. In addition, no significant interaction 
effects were found between disgust sensitivity and instruction on emotional responses. 
  Furthermore, we investigated the influence of emotion regulation strategies and 
disgust sensitivity on punitive judgments. Punitive judgments did not differ from each other 
based on emotion regulation strategies. This is in contrast with our hypothesis, which 
predicted that participants who suppressed emotions would be most severe in their punitive 
judgments, followed by participants who freely experienced emotions and then participants 
who reappraised emotions. Moreover, findings of punitive judgments indicate a certain 
direction that highly disgust-sensitive participants were more severe in their punitive 
judgments than low disgust-sensitive participants. Contrary to our hypothesis, no interaction 
effect was found between instruction conditions and level of disgust sensitivity on punitive 
judgments. 
  Moreover, we also examined the influence of emotion regulation strategies and disgust 
sensitivity on information processing. In line with our hypothesis, some emotion regulation 
strategies influenced information processing. As expected, further analysis showed that 
participants had a better memory of crime scene details when they did not use any kind of 
emotion regulation strategies compared to participants who suppressed emotions. Also in line 
with our hypothesis, participants in the reappraisal condition remembered crime scene details 
equally well compared to participants in the control condition. Contrary to our hypothesis, 
which posed that participants in the reappraisal condition will have a better memory of crime 
scene details compared to participants in the suppression condition, participants in the 
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reappraisal condition remembered crime scene details equally well compared to participants 
in the suppression condition. Moreover, in contrast with our hypothesis, participants with a 
high level of disgust sensitivity remembered crime scene details equally well compared to 
participants with a low level of disgust sensitivity. Also, in contrast with our hypothesis, no 
interaction effect was found between instruction and level of disgust sensitivity on memory of 
crime scene details.  
 To conclude, emotion suppression had more influence on information processing 
compared to freely experiencing emotions. Moreover, emotion reappraisal had the same 
influence on information processing as emotion suppression and freely experiencing 
emotions. In addition, important indications were found in the direction that individuals differ 
in their punitive judgments based on level of disgust sensitivity. However, we did not find 
effects for the other hypothesis. In the following paragraphs of this discussion we will discuss 
inconsistencies of the present study and alternative explanations. Moreover, suggestions will 
be given for future research.  
Limitations and future research 
  The present research has some interesting findings, however it also has some 
limitations and inconsistencies which may explain why we have not found interaction effects 
between instruction and disgust sensitivity on crime scene evaluations. First, the manipulation 
check demonstrated that emotion regulation strategies did not influence the extent of 
emotional responses to the crime scene photographs at the end of the experiment. This 
contradicts our prediction and previous research of Gross (1998a), who found that the 
experience of negative emotions can be reduced by reappraisal of negative emotions, whereas 
emotion suppression could increase the experience of negative emotions (Abramowitz et al., 
2001). Research found that repeated exposure to a fear causing emotional situation decreases 
the experience of fear (Mühlberger, Herrmann, Wiedemann, Ellgring, & Pauli, 2001). A 
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possible explanation for the indifference in emotional responses between conditions may be 
seeing the photographs for the second time at the end of the experiment. Because of repeated 
exposure to the gruesome photographs, the experience of negative emotions may be decreased 
for participants in all conditions, instead of participants in the reappraisal condition only. In 
addition, participants were only instructed in the beginning of the experiment. It may be that 
participants were not aware of the instructions when watching the gruesome visual evidence 
again at the end of the experiment. Further research is needed to investigate if indifferences in 
emotional responses between instruction conditions are caused by presenting the photographs 
for the second time at the end of the experiment. In a follow-up study the emotional responses 
of participants should be measured right after exposure to the photographs for the first time.  
 Secondly, individuals did not differ in their punitive judgments based on emotion 
regulation strategies. Feinberg and colleagues (2012) found that reappraisal led to more 
deliberation of moral judgments and fewer initial moral intuitions. Therefore, we expected 
that participants in the suppression condition were most severe in punitive judgments 
followed by participants in the control condition and then participants in the reappraisal 
condition. Although we found differences in punitive judgments between the conditions in the 
predicted direction, there were also large differences within groups. A possible explanation 
why emotion regulation strategies did not influence punitive judgments could be that there 
was too much individual variation in severity of punitive judgments within groups. We did 
not measure how much knowledge participants had regarding the Dutch criminal justice 
system. This can result in a wide range of variation in years of imprisonment within groups. 
For example, without any framework of sentencing, the same crime could be judged with a 
lifetime of imprisonment or five years of imprisonment to the offender. Further research is 
needed to examine if the indifference in punitive judgments based on instruction is caused by 
individual variation in severity of punitive judgments. Follow-up research should include a 
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questionnaire that measures the knowledge of participants regarding severity in years of 
imprisonment in the Dutch criminal justice system. When participants show large differences 
in knowledge about the Dutch criminal justice system, a framework of sentencing should be 
included. Moreover, measurements of punitive judgments showed important indications that 
individuals differ in their punitive judgments based on level of disgust sensitivity. This is in 
line with previous research of Van Dillen and Vanderveen (2017), who demonstrated that 
participants who were high disgust-sensitive assigned more years of prison sentence to the 
offender after exposure to gruesome visual evidence compared to participants who were less 
disgust-sensitive. However, further research is needed to investigate if this finding indicates 
the right direction and whether it will be found again.  
  Lastly, we found that participants who were instructed to reappraise or suppress their 
emotions remembered crime scene details equally well. In addition, participants who 
reappraised their emotions and participants who were not instructed remembered crime scene 
details equally well. Hence, emotional reappraisal had the same influence on remembering 
crime scene details as emotion suppression and freely experiencing emotions. This is in 
contrast with previous research of D’Argembeau and Van der Linden (2006), who found that 
when participants suppressed their emotions, fewer visual details were remembered compared 
to participants who reappraised emotions. A possible explanation may be that maintaining 
reappraisal of negative emotions became too challenging for some participants (Sheppes & 
Meiran, 2007). Therefore reappraisal changed to some kind of distraction by generating 
neutral thoughts (Sheppes & Meiran, 2007). In addition, Sheppes and Meiran (2008) found 
that distraction influenced working memory, which can explain why some participants in the 
reappraisal condition remembered crime scene details equally well as participants in the 
suppression condition. A follow-up study is needed to investigate if the indifference in 
memory scores between participants in the suppression condition and reappraisal condition is 
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caused by participants who shifted in the reappraisal condition to distraction from the 
gruesome photographs. In a follow-up study can be measured how challenging the emotion 
regulation instructions were for participants and if they used some kind of distraction during 
exposure to the gruesome photographs, with questions at the end of the experiment.  
  More research is needed to further investigate how emotion regulation strategies 
moderate the influence of disgust sensitivity on crime scene evaluations. It is recommended in 
a follow-up study to ask participants about their emotional responses directly after seeing the 
crime scene photographs for the first time and to remind them of the given instructions. It is 
also recommended in further research to include a framework of sentencing the crime scene to 
reduce the within group differences in the instruction conditions. Moreover, it is relevant in 
future research to further investigate whether individuals differ in their punitive judgments 
based on disgust sensitivity. Finally, further research should include questions about 
distraction and how challenging the emotion regulation strategies were for participants. 
Conclusion 
  This study suggests that emotion suppression influences information processing, 
whereas freely experiencing emotions did not. In addition, emotion reappraisal had the same 
influence on information processing as emotion suppression and freely experiencing 
emotions. Moreover, important indications were found in the direction that individuals differ 
in their punitive judgments based on level of disgust sensitivity. However, emotion regulation 
strategies did not moderate the level of disgust sensitivity on crime scene evaluations. To 
explain how emotion regulation strategies can moderate the influence of disgust sensitivity on 
crime scene evaluations further research is needed that takes all the inconsistencies and 
limitation of the present study into account. When we know which emotion regulation 
strategies are effective in reducing the emotional bias without affecting information 
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processing, these strategies can be applied in the Dutch criminal justice system to increase the 
objectivity in legal decision making that gives the offender a more fairly process. 
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Table 1  
Mean and Standard Deviation as a function of Instruction Condition (Suppression vs. 
Reappraisal vs. Control) for Emotional Responses (Gruesomeness, Shockingness, 
Seriousness) 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
                 Emotional responses 
      Gruesomeness      Shockingness                  Seriousness 
        __________________________________________________________________ 
Condition     Mean            SD   Mean            SD  Mean            SD 
Suppression 4.30              1.65  4.38              1.77  4.97           1.52 
Reappraisal 4.17          1.56  4.17              1.62  4.99           1.69 
Control 4.44          1.46  4.46          1.39   5.17           1.39 
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Table 2 
Mean and Standard Deviation (in parentheses) as a function of Instruction Condition 
(Suppression vs. Reappraisal vs. Control) and Disgust Sensitivity (High vs. Low) for 
Emotional Responses (Gruesomeness, Shockingness, Seriousness) 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
                 Emotional responses 
      Gruesomeness      Shockingness                  Seriousness 
        __________________________________________________________________ 
Condition     High             Low   High             Low  High             Low 
Suppression 4.71              3.95  4.88               3.96  5.00           4.95 
  (1.63)          (1.62)  (1.79)            (1.67)  (1.76)           (1.31) 
Reappraisal 4.44          3.93  4.45               3.91  5.09           4.91 
  (1.49)          (1.62)  (1.66)           (1.58)                (1.58)            (1.81) 
Control 4.75          4.06  4.81           4.04   5.27           5.04 
                        (1.50)           (1.35)  (1.40)           (1.30)                (1.41)            (1.39) 
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Table 3  
Mean and Standard Deviation as a function of Instruction Condition (Suppression vs. 
Reappraisal vs. Control) and Disgust Sensitivity (High vs. Low) for Prison Sentence in Years 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
           Disgust Sensitivity  
                   High           Low 
        __________________________________________________________________ 
Condition     Mean   SD   Mean   SD 
Suppression 30.00   16.59   21.67   14.11 
Reappraisal 23.45   18.77   18.41   12.12 
Control 23.16   17.80   20.14   15.32 
 
Table 4  
Means and Standard Deviations as a function of Instruction Condition (Suppression vs. 
Reappraisal vs. Control) and Disgust Sensitivity (High vs. Low) for Memory Scores 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
           Disgust Sensitivity  
                   High                     Low 
        __________________________________________________________________ 
Condition     Mean   SD   Mean   SD 
Suppression 12.90   3.70   13.83   4.18 
Reappraisal 15.25   4.47   14.55   4.04 
Control 16.18   4.04   16.00   3.22 
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Figure 1. Distribution of disgust sensitivity, with on the horizontal axis the disgust sensitivity 
score and on the vertical axis the frequency of the disgust sensitivity score. 
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Appendix A: Displayed photographs during the case evaluations and measurements of 
emotional responses (a-d). 
a. 
 
b. 
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c. 
 
d. 
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Appendix B: Case descriptions. 
Case 1  
“On Monday morning the police department of Leiden received an anonymous tip stating that  
someone got wounded at the Moddermanstraat in Leiden. At arrival the police found the 
moral remains of a 44-year old male. The forensic investigation team was activated 
immediately. The victim has probably been killed by a misdemeanor. At the crime scene it can 
be established, with reasonable suspicion, that the victim was killed by a gunshot wound, 
however no firearm was found. The forensic investigators did the usual forensic research and 
took the following photographs (photographs a and b)’’.  
 
Case 2 
“On Saturday afternoon, the police received a report of a 21-year old student in Amsterdam.  
When she got home, she found her roommate lifeless in bed. Once arrived at the scene, it 
turned out to be the remains of a 22-year old female. Forensic investigators were enabled. 
There is a very strong presumption that the victim was killed by a misdemeanor. Presumably 
she was attacked in the kitchen, after which she was laid in bed by her attacker. The forensic  
investigators did the usual forensic research and took the following photographs 
(photographs c and d)’’.  
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Appendix C: Memory of crime scene details questionnaire*. 
1. Which object did not appear on the nightstand next to the victim? 
a. Mobile phone 
b. Deodorant 
c. Paper handkerchiefs 
d. Lamp 
 
2. What type of pants was the male victim wearing? 
a. Track bottoms 
b. Trousers 
c. Pajama trousers 
d. Jeans 
 
3. Besides the victim’s head, which other places showed the male victim’s blood? 
a. Bed frame, pillowcase, victim’s hand, duvet cover 
b. Pillowcase, duvet cover, T-shirt 
c. T-shirt, victim’s hand, pillowcase 
d. Pillowcase and victim’s hand 
 
4. Where did the male victim have his wound? 
a. Forehead 
b. Left side of the head for the viewer 
c. Right side of the head for the viewer 
d. On top of his head 
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5. Which animal was pictured on the male victim’s T-shirt? 
a. Bear 
b. Wolf 
c. Tiger 
d. Monkey 
 
6. Besides the victim’s head, which other places showed the female victim’s blood? 
a. Bed frame, pillowcase, victim’s hand, duvet cover 
b. Pillowcase, duvet cover 
c. Sweater, victim’s hand, pillowcase 
d. Pillowcase and victim’s hand 
 
7. Where did the female victim have a piercing?  
a. Eyebrow 
b. Nose  
c. Lower lip 
d. She had no piercing 
 
8. What kind of earring was the female victim wearing?  
a. Silver button 
b. Golden ring 
c. Silver cross 
d. No earring 
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9. What were the colors of the female victim’s vest?  
a. Black/beige/blue  
b. Blue/green/beige  
c. Green/beige/brown  
d. Brown/purple/beige 
 
10. With the female victim, on the background, what was the color of the magazine?  
a. Purple 
b. Orange 
c. Blue 
d. Green 
 
11. With the … (1) victim, there was more blood on the pillowcase. With the … (2) victim, 
there was more blood on the head of the victim.  
a. (1) Male victim (2) Female victim  
b. (1) Female victim (2) Male victim 
c. (1) Male victim (2) Male victim 
d. (1) Female victim (2) Female victim 
 
12. The … (1) victim had his/her eyes closed. With the … (2) there was more blood on the 
victim’s clothes.  
a. (1) Male victim (2) Female victim 
b. (1) Female victim (2) Male victim 
c. (1) Male victim (2) Male victim 
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d. (1) Female victim (2) Female victim 
 
13. The backside of the bed frame made in which the male victim was lying, was made of 
what? 
a. Iron 
b. Wood 
c. Plastic 
d. Cotton 
 
14. What was standing on the floor, next to the male victim’s nightstand?  
a. Lamp 
b. Ventilator  
c. Garbage bin  
d. Plant 
 
15. How many bracelets was the female victim wearing on her right arm? 
a. 1 
b. 2 
c. 3 
d. None 
 
16. Where did the female victim have her wound? 
a. Forehead 
b. Left side of the head for the viewer 
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c. Right side of the head for the viewer 
d. On top of her head 
 
17. How many drops of blood were visible on the fitted sheet of the male victim? 
a. 1 
b. 2 
c. 3 
d. None 
 
18. On the male victim, on which two fingers was blood visible? 
a. Thumb and index finger 
b. Ring finger and little finger 
c. Index finger and middle finger 
d. Middle finger and ring finger 
* Correct answers are bold. 
 
